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Abstract: 
In June of 1999, several EU nations issued a joint declaration stating their 
intention to “take steps to insure that any approval for the sale or release of 
GMOs in Europe will be suspended.”  This declaration is the basis of what 
has come to be known as the “de facto moratorium” on genetically 
modified organisms in Europe. 
In this paper we examine how scientific knowledge is used by 
proponents and opponents of gene technology in the context of European 
agricultural policy.  We examine two broad categories of knowledge 
application in this sphere.  On the one hand, scientific knowledge is used in 
the endeavour to “conquer nature” – that is, the uncovering of biological 
mechanisms that make possible the design of agricultural products (usually 
by way of engineering seeds that produce plants with specific traits.)  On 
the other hand, scientific knowledge is deployed in political and cultural 
contexts in the endeavour to “conquer minds” – that is, support for both the 
ongoing research and the ultimate application of that research in the 
production of new crops must be garnered in the public sphere.  The 
current state of public discussion on the issue of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) is illustrative of the way in which these two spheres 
interrelate. 
We will argue that both sides uses scientific knowledge in a 
way that does not acknowledge the social changes in relation to the 
production and use of scientific knowledge in modern society - a global 
risk society. 
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Introduction: 
In a 1997 speech to the International Grains Council, U.S. Secretary of 
Agriculture Dan Glickman, expressed his concern with the state of public 
opinion in Europe on biotechnology.  “I know that biotechnology is an 
extremely sensitive issue here in Europe,” he said, adding that he had been 
“pelted with genetically-engineered soybeans” at the World Food Summit 
by protesters who “then took off all their clothes to draw the media’s 
attention.”  This was “not likely to occur in [his] country,” where “sound 
science is the sole arbiter of our public health decisions.”  He stressed that 
“food safety is an area where Americans feel that government does an 
outstanding job in looking out for them” and that this is the case “despite 
the public’s growing cynicism towards government.”  Glickman expressed 
the “utmost respect for consumers here in Europe” and their “healthy 
scepticism” but he stood firm in his belief that “sound science must trump 
passion” in the case of biotechnology.  This can also be taken to mean that 
in Europe passion has as yet trumped sound science, leading to the current 
EU moratorium on GMOs. 
On Glickman’s view, we know enough about genetic 
engineering to go ahead, on a foundation of “sound science”, with the 
conquest of nature.  The problem in Europe lies with the conquest of minds 
– or, in his phrase, the trumping of passion.  Glickman, and other 
proponents of biotechnology, deploy scientific knowledge to solve this 
problem, using arguments such as “The best scientists in the world have 
shown these means to be safe.”  This argument is normally combined with 
(often quite passionate) appeals to the potential benefits of biotechnology, 
for example:  “...researchers are working not to boost farm incomes, but to 
save the lives of their people.”  
Glickman’s efforts to trump passion with science has to be 
understood in the light of the particular attitudes towards biotechnology 
and food held by the different European publics. And whereas Glickman is 
undoubtedly right in assessing the Europeans as sceptical towards GMOs 
we are less sure of the fruitfulness in diagnosing this attitude as a mere 
problem of educating the public with “sound science”. This is an argument, 
that we will develop with respect to the Danish public - one of the most 
sceptical in Europe in regards to food safety and biotechnology - as an 
illustrative example. 
Europeans in general exhibit widespread scepticism with 
respect to the food they buy.  This can be seen clearly in a Eurobarometer 
survey (1998) about the attitudes of consumers towards food safety: 
 
Indeed, eight out of ten consumers call for more and stricter controls, 
particularly at the production stage. Producers are considered least credible 
when it comes to telling the truth about food. Similarly, consumer 
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associations are considered the most trustworthy, one out of two consumers 
having confidence in them. 
 At any rate, on average, one out of two consumers considers food to be 
safe when it contains neither pesticides nor hormones and when it is 
controlled by competent bodies. 
 In general, there is a relatively low level of confidence in producers, 
whether because of the information they provide about the product or, more 
importantly, because of the fact that they sell products that are profitable, 
but not safe. (Eurobarometer 49 - Food safety, 3.9.1998) 
 
This clearly skeptical attitude with respect to food safety and information 
follows the general tendency shown by an earlier survey (Eurobarometer 
44-3, 1996). This earlier survey also showed, that there is no simple 
relationship between a public being sceptical and a public being more or 
less knowledgeable. For instance, while the Danish public is relatively 
knowledgeable, it is at the same time rather sceptical compared to other 
European publics. So regardless of the fact that the Eurobarometer surveys 
are saddled with a number of methodological problems, and the fact that 
they in 1998 didn’t directly address the issue of GMOs, it is impossible to 
interpret these results as anything other than an expression of a popular 
skepticism that also includes GMOs. What we will follow in this paper is 
therefore the question of how to begin to understand the connection 
between scientific research and public attitudes towards GMOs. We have 
chosen Denmark as an illustrative example. 
 
 
Mass media arguments – the Danish debate: 
A great deal of attention has been directed at GMOs in the Danish mass 
media making it a hot issue in both news and op/ed pieces. The analysis 
does not cover all such contributions, but it can be considered a pilot study 
in which we have focused on contributions to the GMO debate in two 
Danish newspapers during 19991. In particular, we have looked at how 
proponents and opponents of gene technologies use arguments based on the 
distinction between “scientific knowledge” and “passion”, and what 
conception of research and scientific knowledge their arguments imply.  
Our aim has been to present the sorts of arguments that appear in the 
media, not to trace them to their possible source prior to the effects of the 
practices of professional journalism. This is not because we believe these 
practices to be irrelevant, but rather because our aim is to describe the 
arguments that appear not to explain their appearance.  
It should also be noted that we do not attempt to assess the 
correctness or truth of the arguments presented.  We will attempt only to 
show how they are brought to bear on the debate.  In other words, we are 
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not making claims about the opinions of opponents or proponents of gene 
technologies, but only how those opinions look as they appear in the media 
– after the aforementioned journalistic practices.  Finally, our description 
will naturally not be exhaustive; it will merely illustrate certain aspects of 
the use of scientific knowledge in the GMO debates. 
 In Denmark, the primary proponents of biotechnology are the 
companies and scientists involved in GMO research.  These generally 
argue within an interpretative framework conditioned by hope for the 
future.  Science plays an important role in the creation of this future by 
contributing tools for the control of natural processes.  The problems 
associated with biotechnology are presented largely as technical ones, to be 
resolved by further research. They are generally optimistic about the 
possibility of creating a better world by means of biotechnology, and the 
advantages are said to be both of an environmental and an economic kind. 
It is characteristic that this vision of the future makes references 
to as yet non-existent technologies, but the development and 
implementation of which are taken to be just a matter of time. The 
technological futopia is presented as unquestionable – a natural 
consequence of continued research. 
The scepticism with respect to GMOs is, accordingly, presented 
as a transitional phenomenon – a residual of the past, not a symptom the 
future; something which will disappear as the technology progresses.  
Science and technological progress is thus possessed of its own rational 
justification and is in no need of external justification.  As soon as 
consumers see the enormous possibilities of biotechnology their opinions 
will automatically change: 
 
Children’s fashions for geneplants haven’t been particularly stylish.  All that 
talk about Roundup and Basta has hurt the cause.  But if we start getting 
wheat without gluten, so that people with allergies can eat it, and plants that 
are resistant to the most widespread plant diseases such as the fungi in 
potatoes, then its something altogether different.  (Interview with an 
agricultural consultant in Information 9/9, 1999.) 
 
 One particular variant of the argument based on technological 
hope centres on solving the problems of third world hunger.  It is often 
pointed out that the enormous growth of the world’s population demands 
the development of new high-yield crops, and references to the “green 
revolution” of the 1960’s is used as an argument for this solution.  There is 
talk of “moral necessity” and “the fight against hunger” and “saving the 
hungry of Africa”.  The opponents, accordingly, are described as 
reactionary extremists who, with their opposition, prevent “science” from 
helping the developing world.  They put themselves in the way of progress 
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– the development of a good society – by preventing the realisation of the 
research’s potentials. 
Opposition to biotechnology becomes almost immoral in this 
connection.  It is suggested that “we can’t allow ourselves to reject 
genetically modified foods if they are healthier and cheaper” and that “it is 
the environment which will lose out if we don’t accept the new plants.”  
The proponents generally interpret the scepticism of the opponents as an 
irrational fear founded in ignorance.  This fear is presented as something 
that can be conquered with cogent arguments and by informing the public.  
The proponents point out that this is not the first time a new technology has 
been met with resistance in the early stages, and that this resistance will 
hopefully subside when consumers realise what the advantages of 
biotechnology really are.  Because science is essentially rational, it will 
automatically convince the opponents.  Resistance will therefore disappear 
with time and the appearance of even more obviously advantageous GMOs.  
This process can be encouraged with the use of cogent arguments and 
information: 
 
[Right now] it is about feelings but at some point it’s got to be about the 
facts if we’re ever going to get to the bottom of things in the discussion:  
How dangerous is it?  Of what use can it be?  What are the costs if we reject 
gene modification?”  (Interview with a product manager in Politiken 2/6 
1999.) 
 
In sum, it is a persistent characteristic of the arguments of the proponents 
that it rests on an optimistic conception of science as a means to obtain a 
better world through the conquest of nature.  The development of 
genetically modified plants solve a number of problems which we are faced 
with today – pesticide pollutants, hunger, allergies – and the fact that these 
solutions are based on science is presented as a kind of guarantee that they 
are rational.  If there are problems it is because we lack research and 
technological progress – not a sign that we should stop that progress in its 
tracks.  
 In stark contrast to this optimistic vision about the role of science in 
building a better society, the opponents of biotechnology base their rhetoric 
on a fear for the future and the intractable consequences of the 
development of gene technologies.  Instead of seeing technology as the 
solution to social problems, it is presented as the very core of those 
problems. New technologies create new problems even if they may solve 
old ones. The general interpretative framework, then, concerns the fact that 
we don’t know enough about the long term consequences and risks that 
arise in connection with the technology.  Some of the arguments focus on 
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the idea that changing inherited traits means changing something 
fundamental about life.  Something we should not play with: 
 
Genetic engineering is experimentation with our planet.  It may lead to 
irrevocable and intractable damage to nature and human beings, and we 
have no way to change our minds after the fact.  (Politiken, 22/3 1999) 
 
This type of argument, which explicitly or implicitly describes the 
application of biotechnology as a gigantic scientific experiment is very 
ubiquitous among the opponents.  It is suggested that the development of 
gene technologies will turn the world into a giant laboratory in which the 
experiments are uncontrollable and impossible to stop once they have been 
set in motion.  The opponents’ conception of scientific rationality is 
fundamentally different from that of the proponents.  In the eyes of the 
opponents, the researchers have only a limited ability to predict and 
control, and therefore only limited rationality.  This limited rationality is 
seen as being in glaring contrast with the wide-ranging consequences that 
gene technologies can bring.  The opponents, thus, do not share the 
proponents’ optimistic perception of the inherent rationality of 
technological progress.  On the contrary, the rationale of the opponents’ 
arguments is that the risks associated with a global technological 
experiment are far too great to be justified by the advantages of GMOs. 
It is worth noting that the rationale behind the creation of 
scientific knowledge is not often put up for discussion.  The opponents, too, 
use scientific arguments when they justify their fear of intractable and 
irreversible negative effects on people and nature.  One case is the notion 
of “ecological pollution” in which it is suggested that GMOs may spread 
their genes to non-GMOs by the ordinary biological mechanism of 
proliferation.  This argument is often accompanied with scientific evidence 
about the ability of plants to pollinate kindred species (and weeds) and the 
range over which pollens can be spread.  Scientific evidence is also used to 
back up claims that if the use of Roundup-resistant crops leads to overuse 
of Roundup, then weeds too may very quickly develop resistance to 
Roundup. 
 
 
Science or passion? 
We cannot, then, find support for the claim that opponents don’t use or 
understand scientific rationality.  But in contrast to the proponents the 
opponents only ascribe scientific knowledge a limited rationality.  They 
harbour a more sceptical attitude with respect to scientific knowledge.  It 
can be argued that in contrast to the picture of the opponents painted by the 
proponents, the opponents actually attempt to understand dangers, utility, 
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alternatives and costs.  They simply assess and interpret risks and 
advantages differently.  In our eyes, the lines of division between 
opponents and proponents do not run between accepting and rejecting 
scientific rationality, but between the answers to two rather different 
questions.  First, Who appears as a trustworthy representative of scientific 
rationality?  And second, how broad is the sphere of application for 
scientific rationality? 
In regard to questions of trust, it is remarkable how the 
opponents distinguish between different forms of scientific rationality.  On 
the one hand, there is lack of trust in the scientific authority found in 
biotechnology companies.  Scientists employed by industry are portrayed 
as working entirely in the service of an economic rationality.  And it is 
commonly argued that precisely because it is private economic interests 
that drive research in biotechnology, this research should be considered 
suspect.  On the other hand, there is nothing to suggest that opponents 
harbour mistrust of publicly funded research, which is often what they 
demand more of.  It is possible to interpret their arguments as a denial that 
privately funded research into the risks of biotechnology is supported by 
scientific rationality in any way. 
In regard to the sphere of application for rationality, we note 
that the opponents’ primary critique of the proponents is that their risk 
assessments are far too narrow.  They accuse the proponents of not taking 
long term effects into account, whether as a human health concern, or as a 
concern about the continuing use of chemical herbicides, biodiversity and 
transfer of resistance.  They proceed from fears about the rise of new 
problems instead of accepting the proponents’ hopes about solutions to old 
problems.  While the proponents focus on enormous possibilities, the 
opponents focus on enormous risks.  Conversely, while the proponents 
suggest very small risks, the opponents’ assessments point to limited future 
possibilities. 
A fundamental difference between the two types of 
argumentation lies in their approach to the unknown.  Or differently put, 
how each party interprets and assesses uncertainty in connection with 
research and technological progress.  When the basic assumptions are 
centred on hope for the future, uncertainty is interpreted as opportunities 
fore great strides forward.  This is the case with the proponents of GMOs.  
But if research and technological progress are understood in terms of the 
risks they bring, then the same uncertainties are interpreted as signs not to 
move forward with the new technology. 
The debate about the application of GMOs, which we have 
exemplified, has escalated dramatically in Denmark and the EU.  It is 
played out as an irreconcilable struggle between proponents – normally 
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large corporations – and opponents – environmental organisations, 
consumers, and a number of politicians.  The arguments for and against are 
complicated and not free of contradictions and paradoxes.  Proponents 
deploy arguments in full confidence that their scientific foundations 
provides all the certainty it is reasonable to demand.  Opponents, 
meanwhile, demand more knowledge, express mistrust of corporate 
knowledge, and sometimes link this to doomsday scenarios for the future. 
 
 
Scientific knowledge in a risk society: 
Vi have up to this point focused on the content of this debate as presented 
in the media.  Its unusual durability in the press gives us good reason to 
conclude that it is of concern to a great number of people.  We will in what 
follows attempt to incorporate sociological theory – not because our aim is 
to justify or corroborate the above investigation, but instead to include a 
broader perspective on the problems that are highlighted in the public 
debate.  In particular, we want to shed some light on the relationship 
between science, risk assessment and society.  By using sociological theory 
– a theory of the risk society – we can attempt to get further into the 
complicated explanatory structures and logic which have conditioned the 
debate. 
Based on the above cited Eurobarometer investigation about the 
attitudes of consumers to food safety, we conclude that there is a broad 
public scepticism about food safety in Europe. As this paper shows, GMOs 
are also subject to this scepticism. There is a general lack of trust in the 
information that producers provide consumers about their products. The 
existence of these attitudes can seem surprising in light of the intensive 
campaigns and wide media coverage which have attempted to show that 
gene technologies are safe and that science stands behind this conclusion. 
But the extent of popular scepticism or uncertainty in the areas of food 
safety – an uncertainty which is confirmed again and again by one case 
after another about dangerous foods, BST, salmonella, etc. – is presumably 
the reason that the EU has begun a process of revising and tightening the 
rules for control and approval of food products. This, in response to the 
public debates.  
The theory of risk-society (Beck 1992, 1999) provides us with 
some important starting points for an understanding of the social conditions 
which the above is a part of.  A very important feature of the risk society is 
the consequences which are drawn from social and political experience 
with the unforeseen and often catastrophic results of applied science and 
technology in industrial capitalism. The unforeseen results have blazed a 
dramatic trail since the second world war from Bhopal to Chernobyl. The 
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most important consequence of this is probably that the traditional status of 
science as unquestionable knowledge, knowledge which represents the 
final truth in a particular area, is changing and declining in clear opposition 
to the scientific and technological optimism which characterises industrial 
capitalism.  Public discussion and confrontation between experts and 
counter-experts over the interpretation of scientific knowledge and its 
consequences, and the increasing use of alternative expert opinion and 
surveys in public debate by social movements and organisations are signs 
of the softening of structure of authority within science and of a lack of 
social and political trust in this knowledge.  As Beck notes, 
 
The crucial issue of reflexive modernization, however is this: how do ‘we’ 
(experts, social movements, ordinary people, politicians, not to forget 
sociologists) deal with our unawareness (or inability to know)? How do we 
decide in and between manufactured uncertainties? (Beck 1999 p. 13). 
 
One of the perhaps surprising consequences of this uncertainty is that the 
experts who mediate the application of knowledge in the public and 
political sphere themselves play an increasing central role in the political 
process. Beck points out that this process is rife with contradictions.  
Different experts oppose each other and virtually challenge each other’s 
scientific authority.  This is in perfect accord with a demonstration of the 
limits of the sorts of solutions provided by scientific rationality.  It 
therefore opens the public’s understanding to the possibility that scientific 
knowledge is not as certain as it traditionally has been taken to be and that 
alternative forms of knowledge are possible. 
The critique of scientific knowledge is thus accompanied by an 
increasing acceptance of local, ‘popular’ knowledge, lay knowledge, which 
is locally based and has no pretensions to universality (Wynne 1996b).  It 
can exist among ‘ordinary people’ and is developed through experience and 
dialogue.  As Brian Wynne writes, 
 
. . . a general reason for possible divergence between expert and public 
knowledges about risks is that expert knowledge embodies social assump-
tions and models framing its objectivist language, and lay people have 
legitimate claim to debate those assumptions.  (1996a, p. 59) 
 
One explanation for the fact that this situation gains more and more weight 
lies in the increasing indvidualisation of the risk society.  This in turn has 
been due to a number of changes in the social structure of society – classes, 
family patterns, career choices, traditions, norms - are undergoing changes 
so as to lose importance for the way in which the individual organisers her 
own life.  The individual gains extensive freedom to plan her life.  But this 
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freedom brings with it a feeling of risk and uncertainty which reaches deep 
into her daily activities in the form of demands to take stances on a variety 
of issues.  High levels of education in western welfare societies, which is a 
precondition of this individualisation, is at the same a cause of the decline 
in the traditional trust in scientific authority.  The basis for optimism about 
technology is thereby also undermined. 
 The extent and intensity of the public debate about GMOs has, of 
course, much to do with the central role of food in daily living, and its 
connection to a series of historical, cultural and, not least, psychological 
dimensions which call on the public’s interest.  But it is at the same time 
the case that discussion among experts and the production of new 
knowledge has taken place within a very narrow and traditional scientific 
discourse. 
The dominating approach to risk assessment of genetically 
modified food has been to place the burden of proof on those who claim the 
product to be unsafe.  But there are often no trustworthy methods for 
establishing the effects of a product on the environment, and time is rarely 
set aside for testing over the long term.  This means that it is difficult to 
find examples of risk assessments based on the classical canons of 
scientific rationality, such as Popper’s falsification principle.  It is much 
more often the case that testing and application of new products are tightly 
interwoven.  This is in part due to the enormous costs of developing the 
technology, and of applying it.  Development of new products in fact often 
presupposes their production.  In such a situation, the expert is on unsure 
ground and can be considered almost a layman, who cannot be held 
responsible for his mistakes.  The result is what Beck calls “organised 
irresponsibility” under the banner of scientific justification.  This almost 
ideological invocation of scientific authority, used both by public 
institutions and multinational corporations, is often met with a critique that 
simply points out the thin scientific basis behind the invocation. The 
thinness of the scientific basis in relation to the arguments they are 
supposed to support seem to have completely escaped the internal self-
conceptualisation of science. 
Beck has stated a fundamental issue that society faces in what 
he calls “the second modernity” as follows: 
 
To repress or to acknowledge knowledge (on all sides), that is, the Hamlet 
question which is being posed on the dividing line of the second, non-linear 
modernity. 
 In contrast, a double construction of unawareness characterizes linear 
modernization. First, other forms of knowledge are blocked out and 
rejected, and, second, we deny our own inability to know. This applies not 
just to experts, but to activist movements as well. The former stands with 
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their backs to the future and operates in the false self-assurance that comes 
from having denied their unawareness. The latter dogmatize their 
(un)awareness for purposes of political intervention. It is precisely this 
admitted uncertaincy which opens the context of action for industrial 
modernity. Both groups would have to look at themselves from outside, so 
to speak, in order to understand and shape reflexive modernity’s horizon of 
uncertaincy in constructive political terms. 
Both issues of second modernity - the deliberate acknowledge of 
outside perspectives and rationalities, on the one hand, and the explicit 
working out and processing of unawareness, on the other, - have not really 
become an issue so far. (Beck, 1999, p.131) 
 
This criticism is directed towards the exclusion of those 
political and social factors which surround the application of scientific 
knowledge in the traditional narrow forms of applied science and risk 
assessment, in situations where the rational foundations of scientific 
inquiry have been such that laboratory testing has been replaced with 
assessments of the risks of immediate application. The focus on the social 
use of scientific knowledge in risk societies not only questions the authority 
of science and experts but has taken the process of decision making from 
closed offices in business and state bureaucracy to a much more open 
political debate. And a large part of the uncertainty in the argumentation for 
and against GMO technology is a result of this radical change of the 
authority of science. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
To the extent to which scientific knowledge and its dissemination 
encounter difficulties in managing  the vague boundary between knowledge 
and non-knowledge in a risk society, and to the extent to which this 
boundary is connected to a ‘manufactured uncertainty’ in which scientific 
rationality is ill suited for distinguishing between the development and 
application of experimental knowledge, we may expect the invocation of 
scientific knowledge in public debate to assume an ideological character.  
This may block or slow down the application of scientific knowledge and 
technology. 
 
------------------------ 
                                                          
1 The analysis draws on 216 newspaper articles and op/ed pieces from the period January 1, 1999 to 
November 30, 1999 from two Danish newspapers, Politiken, a newspaper with a large nation-wide 
circulation and a traditional social and liberal profile and Information, a  much smaller newspaper with 
an intellectual affiliation and a marked critical interest in debates on technology. 
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